此书是博弈论领域的两位世界级大师（诺贝尔经济学奖得主和美国科学院院士）的集大成之作，不仅涵盖了博弈论的方方面面，而且对每一个论题都给出了严密的数学推导和证明，并配以丰富的实例和精心构思的习题。自1991年出版以来，本书以其关于博弈论体系和发展方向的把握，立即成为国际上博弈论领域最权威的教材，至今无人超越，对全世界博弈论教育产生了深远影响。此书是经济学研究生和高年级本科生学习博弈论的极佳教材，也是任何对博弈论有兴趣的读者的必备参考书。

Acknowledgments
IntroductiOn
I Static Games of Complete Information
1 Games in Strategic Form and Nash Equilibrium
1.1 Introduction to Games in Strategic Form and Iterated
Strict Dominance
1.1.1 Strategic—Form Games
1.1.2 Dominated Strategies
1.1.3 Applications of the Elimination of Dominated
Strategies
1.2 Nash Equilibrium
1.2.1 Definition of Nash Equilibrium
1.2.2 Examples of Pure-Strategy Equilibria
1.2.3 Nonexistence of a Pure-Strategy Equilibrium
1.2.4 Multiple Nash Equilibria，Focal Points，and Pareto Optimality
1.2.5 Nash Equilibrium as the Result of Learning or Evolution
1.3 Existence and Properties of Nash Equilibria
1.3.1 Existence of a Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium
1.3.2 The Nash-Equilibrium Correspondence Has a Closed Graph
1.3.3 Existence of Nash Equilibrium in Infinite Games with Continuous Payoffs
Exercises
References
2 Iterated Strict Dominance，Rationalizability，and
Correlated Equilibrium
2.1 Iterated Strict Dominance and Rationalizability
2.1.1 Iterated Strict Dominance：Definition and
Properties
2.1.2 An Application of Iterated Strict Dominance
2.1.3 Rationalizability
2.1.4 RatiOnalizabilitv and Iterated Strict Dominance
2.1.5 Discussion
2.2 Correlated Equilibrium
2.3 Rationalizability and Subjective Correlated Equilibria
Exercises
References
II Dynamic Games of Complete Information
3 Extensive-Form Games
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Commitment and Perfection in Multi-Stage Games with
Observed Actions
3.2.1 What Is a Multi-Stage Game?
3.2.2 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection
3.2.3 The Value of Commitment and“Time Consistency”
3.3 The Extensive Form
3.3.1 Definition
3.3.2 Multi.Stage Games with Observed Actions
3.4 Strategies and Equilibria in Extensive-Form Games
3.4.1 Behavior Strategies
3.4.2 The Strategic-Form Representation of Extensive-Form Games
3.4.3 The Equivalence between Mixed and Behavior
Strategies in Games ofPerfect Recall
3.4.4 Iterated Strict Dominance and Nash Equilibrium
3.5 Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection
3.6 Critiques of Backward Induction and Subgame Perfection
3.6.1 Critiques of Backward Induction
3.6.2 Critiques of Subgame Perfection
Exercises
References
4 Applications of Multi-Stage Games with Observed Actions
4.1 IntrOduction
4.2 The Principle of Optimality and Subgame Perfection
4.3 A First Look at Repeated Games
4.3.1 The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
4.3.2 A Finitely Repeated Game with Several Static
Equilibria
4.4 The Rubinstein-Stahl Bargaining Model
4.4.1 A Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium
4.4.2 Uniqueness of the Infinite-Horizon Equilibrium
4.4.3 Comparative Statics
4.5 Simple Timing Games
4.5.1 Dcfinition of Simple Timing Games
4.5.2 The War of Attrition
4.5.3 Preemption Games
……
5 Repeated Games
III Static Games of Incomplete Information
6 Bayesian Games and Bayesian Equilibrium
7 Bayesian Games and Mechanism Design
IV Dynamic Games of Incomplete Information
8 Equilibrium Refinements：Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium，Sequential Equilibrium，and Trembling-Hand Perfection
9 Reputation Effects
10 Sequential Bargaining under Incomplete Information
V Advanced Topics
11 More Equilibrium Refinements：Stability，Forward Induction，and Iterated Weak Dominance
12 Advanced Topics in Strategic—Form Games
13 Payoff-Relevant Strategies and Markov Equilibrium
14 Common Knowledge and Games
Index